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American jurisprudence abhors insider trading' with a fervor re-
served for those who scoff at motherhood, apple pie, and baseball. The
commonly stated reasons for this reaction to insider trading are many
and unpersuasive. The case law barely suggests why insider trading is
harmful. The Supreme Court has condemned insider trading under the
federal securities laws when the trading violates a fiduciary's obligations. 2
The Court did so, however, without revealing how such trading harms
the corporation, threatens investors, or erodes the functioning of securi-
ties markets. Commentators have attempted to complete the opaque mo-
saic left by the Court's reasoning by advancing two theories. First, they
argue that insider trading is unfair.3 Second, they offer highly refined
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1. This article uses the term "insiders" to refer to those who hold managerial positions-
corporate officers, directors, and middle managers-within the business organization. Recent en-
forcement practices have given insider trading a broader context by focusing on various types of
professionals, from lawyers to investment bankers to printers. This article does not focus on these
professional groups because with respect to such groups it is easy to justify the regulation of insider
trading. These professionals usually trade using information that the client has generally taken great
steps to keep secret. An early release of this information through the professional's trading unques-
tionably threatens the client's interest. See, eg., Power, Litton Sues Levine, Shearson Lehman Over
Itek Trading, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1986, at 2, col. 3. The best evidence of this threat is the fact that
the professional is swiftly dismissed when his employer discovers that he has abused the client's trust
by trading on the client's information. On the other hand, there is no evidence that employers
dismiss officers, directors, or even middle managers for insider trading. The free-market proponents
argue that insider trading gives officers, directors, and managers an incentive to create events so that
they can trade. The presence of these factors makes inquiry into the trading by officers, directors,
and managers a more puzzling problem than is the case with respect to market professionals.
2. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3. The most elusive complaint lodged against insider trading is that it is "unfair." This com-
plaint has two distinct aspects. First, the insider is seen as having an unerodible advantage over
others who cannot obtain the same information. Second, the information was produced not for the
benefit of the inside trader, but rather as a result of the employer's quest for gain. See Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV L.
REV. 322, 356-57 (1979). The second point is an indispensable qualification of the first in character-
izing trading as unfair, because the experience, intelligence, resources, or position of some investors
will always give them superior insight into prospective market developments. For example, a bro-
kerage house first makes its recommendations to its most important clients. Additionally, no one
believes that it is "unfair" for an investor to purchase a security without disclosing his belief that the
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arguments explaining how insider trading impacts the corporation's op-
eration,4 investor behavior, 5 and the allocational efficiency of capital
markets. 6 The indeterminacy of these approaches is examined closely
below.
Part I of this article criticizes the Supreme Court's contemporary
justifications for regulating insider trading.7 It develops the view that the
stock is a "bargain." Disclosure of such information would be dysfunctional because such disadvan-
tages are inherent and necessary components of an exchange economy. See Hethrington, Insider
Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720, 725-30. Allowing the producer of infor-
mation to prohibit another's use of that information is socially desirable in certain circumstances.
See Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1323-
28 (1981).
The concept of "unfairness" represents nothing more than a highly stylized line separating
lawful and unlawful conduct. There are substantial "fairness" justifications for identifying investors
who use an informational advantage for trading purposes. These include protecting the economic
benefits that accompany both the production of the information and its private use by its producer.
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market
Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 808-09 (1973). The logic of the opposite side of this fairness
argument, however, is not intuitively obvious. The need to encourage economically desirable con-
duct may justify one party's use of nonpublic information, but the same need does not necessarily
proscribe a second person from using the same information, so long as the second person's use does
not impair the first person's use. In fact, commentators who favor the legalization of insider trading
have turned the fairness argument around by arguing that permitting insider trading provides incen-
tives to undertake economically worthwhile activities. See Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 857, 866-72 (1983). These free-market proponents have argued
that information differs from most commodities in that one person's use of the information does not
necessarily prevent another person from gaining equal or greater advantages from the same informa-
tion. Thus, "unfairness" by itself is an insufficient basis to condemn insider trading. Professor Brnd-
ney, however, coupled "unfairness" arguments with concerns over whether insider trading harms
market efficiency, impairs market integrity, induces manipulative practices, or increases the corpora-
tion's cost of capital. Brudney, supra, at 334-35, 356.
4. Relying on organizational behavior literature, Professor Haft has suggested that a laissez
faire approach toward insider trading will promote information delays, manipulation of corporate
releases, and intrafirm competition that is harmful to the corporation. See Haft, The Effect of In-
sider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1051,
1051-64 (1982). Haft fails to consider an equally plausible middle ground: that market constraints
prevent insiders from trading to an extent that their trading significantly harms the corporation.
Professors Jensen and Meckling suggest that the market for managerial talent and corporate control
operate as such preventative market constraints. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man-
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 328-29 (1976). These
market constraints on excessive insider trading are not, however, absolute under the Jensen and
Meckling model. Professors Jensen and Meckling argue that a certain amount of managerial misbe-
havior is optimal. Id. at 345-51.
5. See, eg., Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets:
Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1235-
40 (1981) (arguing that insider trading either induces the unwitting investor to trade or preempts a
price otherwise available to an outsider).
6. See, eg., Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Infor-
mation, 73 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1115-20 (1985) (investors prefer markets where managers have no hid-
den incentive to delay release of information and are otherwise compelled to disclose all material
information prior to their private use of that information).
7. See infra notes 11-31 and accompanying text.
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limitations that Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC impose on
the disclose-or-abstain rule are completely artificial. Part II challenges
the prevalent view that insider trading affects the market's allocational
efficiency.8 Accepting the assumption that insider trading leads to the
manipulation of corporate disclosures, this article uses the capital market
theory to demonstrate that insider trading harms neither the individual
investor nor the market's allocational efficiency. Part III critically ana-
lyzes and takes exception to the emerging arguments of those commenta-
tors who contend that the present form of insider trading regulation is
unjustified and that the law should allow corporations to license their
agents to engage in insider trading.9 Finally, in the wake of the excep-
tions taken to the Supreme Court and the commentators, Part IV pro-
vides a coherent justification for continuing the regulation of insider
trading.10
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S IMPACT ON INSIDER TRADING
As originally formulated, the disclose-or-abstain rule prohibited
trading by anyone on the basis of material nonpublic information. I  The
Court formulated the rule believing that the integrity and efficiency of
securities markets would be eroded if investors were not confident that
all market participants enjoyed the same access to inside information
when trading. 12 For a while, this lofty mission guided the courts' hold-
ings that the SEC,13 the injured investor,14 and the corporation in whose
shares the defendant traded 15 enjoy significant rights against violators of
8. See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 49-85 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
11. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
12. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 851-52.
13. See id. The deterrence value of requiring the insider and his tippee to merely disgorge
profits earned before public disclosure of the information is inherently weak. Current enforcement
techniques include criminal actions by the Department of Justice as well as civil sanctions by the
SEC. The government can impose a fine up to $100,000, as well as a penalty up to three times the
insider's profits. See infra note 56.
14. Private parties can recover only the insider's profits. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); cf Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 322 & n.33 (6th Cir.
1976) (expressing support for rule that limits recovery to amount of insider's profits), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977). The disgorgement remedy does not include the gains the individual trading
investors would have reaped had the insider disclosed the information before trading. This remedy
is consistent with the thesis of this article-that investors are not harmed by insider trading.
15. The corporation's right to recover its fiduciary's profits depends on the willingness of the
particular jurisdiction to assume that trading harms the corporation. In Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82 (1969), the New York Court of
Appeals presumed that insider trading causes reputational injury to the corporation in all cases. In
Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191-96 (7th Cir. 1978), the United States Court of Appeals for the
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the disclose-or-abstain rule. The utopian dream of information parity
among investors was short-lived, however. Two Supreme Court deci-
sions have revolutionized the rule's application, rendering the rationale
underlying insider-trading regulation a dark mystery.
In Chiarella v. United States, 16 the Supreme Court held that the
only persons subject to the disclose-or-abstain rule are those with a pre-
existing fiduciary relationship to the corporation in whose shares they
trade. Chiarella, a markup man employed by Pandick Press, broke the
secret code that his employer devised to conceal the identity of its clients
and their takeover targets. On five occasions Chiarella purchased the
target's shares before a takeover bid was announced. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, rejected the lower court's invocation of the so-
called parity-of-information rule that "[alnyone- corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use
that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 17 The Court held that Chiarella's fiduciary relation-
ship was with Pandick Press and the bidder corporation. Chiarella did
not have a duty to disclose or abstain because he did not have a fiduciary
relationship with the target corporation in whose shares he traded.
18
Later, in Dirks v. SEC, 19 the Court underscored the importance of a
preexisting fiduciary relationship when it held that outsiders may freely
trade on an insider's selective disclosure so long as the disclosure was not
"improper."20 Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America,
informed Dirks, an investment analyst, that Equity Funding's assets were
fraudulently overstated. In the course of his aggressive investigation,
Dirks shared Secrist's revelations with five investment advisers. These
advisers caused their clients to liquidate more than sixteen million dollars
worth of Equity Funding stock before the scandal was publicly disclosed.
The Dirks Court easily could have held that since Secrist could not le-
gally trade on the information, his tippees also could not trade. Instead,
Dirks held that outsiders may freely trade on the insider's selective dis-
closure so long as that disclosure was not "improper."' 2' According to
the Court, a disclosure is improper if the insider tips a relative or expects
Seventh Circuit considered whether the corporation could have lawfully used the information. And
in Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975), the Florida Supreme Court stated that it would
permit recovery only upon proof of actual harm to the corporation.
16. 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980).
17. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
19. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).




to make a pecuniary gain from the selective disclosure. 22
The threshold appeal of the Court's reasoning in Dirks lies in the
fact that according analysts greater freedom furthers the efficient func-
tioning of securities markets because it does not condemn the analyst to
ferret out material nonpublic corporate information under a fear of vio-
lating the antifraud rule. This reasoning, however, has only a superficial
appeal and fits the Dirks facts poorly. To be sure, the analyst and the
corporate executive should be protected from draconian sanctions when
the analyst, through persistence, has wrung an important selective disclo-
sure from the executive and then made that disclosure generally available
through a public medium. However, Dirks tipped his clients and at-
tempted to give publicity to Equity Funding's fraudulent practices. In
this respect, his gains were not all of the heart, but included earning com-
missions and establishing goodwill with the tipped clients.
Dirks's gains were no different than Merrill Lynch's gains garnered
some years earlier in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.23
As lead underwriter for Douglas Aircraft, Merrill Lynch learned that
Douglas's inventories were going to be written down because of produc-
tion delays caused by the Vietnam War. Merrill Lynch tipped several of
its clients, thereby triggering a significant decline in Douglas Aircraft's
stock before Douglas eventually announced the writedowns. There is lit-
tle question that Merrill Lynch would have been beyond the Dirks pro-
tection. Under the Dirks view, Merrill Lynch would be an insider with
disclose-or-abstain obligations similar to those of Secrist.24 On the other
hand, if Merrill Lynch had not been Douglas's underwriter and a Doug-
las officer had gratuitously informed Merrill Lynch of the pending
writedown, Merrill Lynch's position would have been identical to that of
Raymond Dirks. In each case, however, the analyst's private gains are at
the expense of unsuspecting buyers. Dirks does not examine why duties
under the disclose-or-abstain rule should depend upon the technical nice-
ties of the analyst's position or the fact of a reward to an insider rather
than upon some more useful insight into why employers prefer that trad-
ing and tipping by its insiders be circumscribed. Market efficiency is en-
hanced regardless of whether the analyst or other financial intermediary
confers a benefit, financial or otherwise, upon the tipping insider. More-
over, it is quite reasonable to expect that a fiduciary's unauthorized pre-
mature disclosure could harm his employer's interests, regardless of
whether he gains from that revelation. A further anomaly of Dirks is
that state law, the source of all underlying fiduciary duties, does not re-
22. Id. at 663-64.
23. 495 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1974).
24. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
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quire a finding of personal gain as a prerequisite to establishing miscon-
duct.25 Nevertheless, Chiarella and Dirks emphasized reward to the
insider, not harm to the employer.
Another development attributable to Chiarella is the so-called "mis-
appropriation theory."'26 Under this theory, an employee who makes an
unauthorized use of his employer's information by trading in another
corporation's stock would appear to be violating Rule lOb-5's proscrip-
tion of "any fraudulent scheme" by "any person" as well as reaping the
kind of "undue trading advantage" that serves no "useful purpose" pro-
scribed in the legislative history of the Exchange Act. Superficially, the
misappropriation theory appears to be a natural analogue to Chiarella
because it underscores the necessity for a fiduciary relationship to exist
before the disclose-or-abstain rule applies. Certainly an employee's mis-
use of his employer's property, whether that property be tangible or in-
tangible, is a clear example of fiduciary misconduct.27 Moreover, the
misappropriation theory is designed to protect the employer's property
right to the information.
28
25. See generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 147-50, 155-56 (1986) (unfairness in "self-deal-
ing" transactions arises from harm to either corporation or stockholders; such self-dealing harms
corporation because it creates investor uncertainty over frequency and magnitude of self-dealing,
thereby increasing the corporation's cost of capital); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795,
821-32 (1983) (nature and extent of fiduciary's obligations arises from entrusting party's natural
expectations of how fiduciary will discharge powers entrusted to him). There are of course instances
in which corporate fiduciaries are required to disgorge their gains as a prophylactic measure, even
though the corporation or its shareholders have suffered no tangible harm. See, eg., Perlman v.
Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955). Even in these cases, the remedy as well as the duty are
driven by a concern for protecting the stockholders or the corporation from potential harm.
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. Some commentators argue that the presence or absence of a fiduciary relationship should be
irrelevant under the misappropriation theory. They reason that the antifraud rule should be no less
inclusive than the common law in removing informational advantages gained tortiously or illegally.
See, e.g., Barry, supra note 3, at 1363. However, closer analysis reveals that the common law im-
poses no duty to disclose to one party when information has been purloined from another. The
common law only provides a remedy to the information's creator against the misappropriator of that
information. See generally G. BOWER & A. TURNER, THE LAW OF ACTIONABLE MISREPRESEN-
TATION 103-08 (1974). The disclosure obligation under the Supreme Court's misappropriation the-
ory thus has no common law parallel. Even common law copyright and design cases provide a
remedy for only the information's creator; they exclude those who deal with the misappropriator.
Cf Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 34, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889) (inventor selling machine without
pattern retains exclusive property right in machine's pattern). Moreover, a nonemployee's use of a
creator's information results in the imposition of a constructive trust only if the nonemployee knew
he acquired the information through another's breach of fiduciary duty. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp,
135 F.2d 303, 306 (10th Cir. 1943).
28. Some commentators have argued that in Chiarella and Dirks the Supreme Court intended
to protect the corporation's "property interest" in the information. These commentators suggest
that the Court's holdings should ultimately lead to recognizing the corporation's power to license
insider trading. See e.g., Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 9, 39-47 (1984).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1986:628
The misappropriation theory, even though a logical adjunct to the
employer's expectations and the fiduciary obligations of its employees,
resonates poorly with Rule lOb-5, the provision under which most par-
ties prosecute insider trading cases. 29 In other contexts, Rule lOb-5 is
devoted to protecting investors and securities markets from deceptive
practices. For example, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green 30 the Supreme
Court ruled that the antifraud rule did not apply when the complaint
alleged no more than a breach of fiduciary duty or unfair dealings. The
misappropriation theory, however, expands the antifraud rule to protect
an employer's expectations that his employee will not use the employer's
information for private gain. It is difficult to reconcile cases such as
Santa Fe Industries with the misappropriation cases because the misap-
propriation cases emphasize the "unfairness" to the employment rela-
tionship,31 regardless of the impact upon another's investment decision,
and not deception and manipulation. More importantly, the Supreme
Court's insider trading decisions have left in their wake only the empty
concepts of "fiduciary," "improper disclosure," and "misappropriation."
Neither these decisions nor subsequent lower court decisions consider the
social benefits of regulating insider trading. The fact that such an aggres-
sive level of regulation exists without a coherent, let alone articulated,
philosophy of regulation is one of the most unsettling aspects of the fed-
eral securities laws.
29. In United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit attempted to bring the misappropriation theory within contemporary
Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence by reasoning that injunctive relief is available under the antifraud rule even
when the fraud did not give rise to a purchase or sale. As support, however, the court cited cases
that either involved market manipulation affecting the share's value or conduct compelling the plain-
tiff to sell his stock. See id. at 17 (citing Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787,
798 (2d Cir. 1969); and Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967)).
The court also invoked Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), to
reach fraudulent conduct affecting an employer. Bankers Life, however, upheld the application of
Rule lOb-5 upon the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant had deceived the company's board of
directors into selling their United States Treasury bonds. Id. at 8 n.1.
Investors who purchase from or sell to the misappropriating defendant lack standing to com-
plain under the misappropriation theory because they are not the objects of the "fraud." See Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
30. 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977). The argument against the misappropriation theory is even
stronger with respect to the antifraud provision of the Williams Act because the purpose of the
Williams Act is to protect the shareholders of publicly traded corporations. See Schreiber v. Bur-
lington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458, 2463 (1985).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 1986 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,742, at 93,613 (2d
Cir. 1986); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 437-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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II. THE ALLOCATIONAL EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT
The grafting of the misappropriation theory to the antifraud provi-
sion is one of the Court's most truthful admissions in applying Rule lOb-
5 to insider trading: the regulation of insider trading cannot be justified
out of concern for protecting the unwary investor. Insider trading is at
most a fortuity for the investor32 because the investor is no worse off
when the insider trades than when the insider does not trade.
3 3 The in-
vestor's decision to sell or purchase is unaffected by whether the insider is
also secretly buying or selling shares in the open market. If the insider
neither trades nor discloses his confidential material information, one can
nevertheless expect the investor to pursue his trading plan. Sellers natu-
rally are disadvantaged by the nondisclosure of good news, just as buyers
are disadvantaged by the nondisclosure of bad news. These considera-
tions, however, cast no light on why the insider's decision to trade should
prompt disclosure. Therefore, the focus turns toward a concern greater
than the individual investor's injury-namely, the operation of securities
markets. Consequently, commentators have directed their attention to
how insider trading affects the allocational efficiency of those markets.
3 4
Commentators have spent a great deal of time speculating over how
and why insider trading impairs the market's allocational efficiency, but
there is very little evidence to support the conclusion that it does.
Clearly it is a non sequitur to reason, as some commentators have,
35 that
the market's operation is impeded because the market would learn about
the information sooner if the insider did not trade. This reasoning over-
looks the fact that there is no natural connection between the insider's
trading and the delay of a corporate disclosure.
36 Certainly managers
who have a direct and immediate gain awaiting their disclosure of corpo-
32. See, eg., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
33. Some have suggested that the insider's trading does harm the outside investor by either
preempting a price otherwise available to him or by inducing him to sell or purchase because of the
increased activity in the stock. See Wang, supra note 5, at 1235. Neither harm is likely if the
insider's trading is insignificant. Even if the insider's trading is significant, the harm in the pre-
empted price situation is likely to be small; in the increased trading situation, the insider's trading
causes the parallel trader to dispose of a dog or acquire a pearl.
34. See Scholtland, Unsafe at any Price" A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1448-49 (1967); Mendelson, The Economics Board of Insider Trading
Reconsidered (Book Review), 117 U. PA. L. REv. 470, 477-78 (1969) (reviewing H. MANNE, IN-
SIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)); cf. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 631-35 (1984) (arguing that if insider trading is legalized,
insiders should be required to disclose, at some point prior to trading, the identity and size of the
intended trade).
35. See Scholtland, supra note 34, at 1448-49; Mendelson, supra note 34, at 489.
36. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 34 (1980).
Nevertheless, commentators cannot obtain a complete understanding of management's disclosure
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rate information have a greater incentive to make the announcement
than do managers who do not have a personal gain awaiting disclosure.
On the other hand, if the insider must sacrifice his informational advan-
tage before he trades, then not only is his incentive to trade removed, but
also his incentive to make an earlier disclosure is dampened.
37
The proponents of the disclose- or-abstain rule emphasize the need
to regulate insider trading because they perceive the capital market's in-
stitutional integrity as the cornerstone of allocational efficiency. 38 Two
questions test the accuracy of this view: How does insider trading erode
the market's integrity? And how does such erosion impair allocational
efficiency? The first question raises an issue that was addressed previ-
ously-whether there is a causal relationship between insider trading ac-
tivity and the accuracy and timeliness of corporate disclosures.
Proponents of the disclose-or-abstain rule believe that a perfectly laissez
faire attitude toward insider trading would give an insider the leverage
needed to manipulate the securities market to maximize his own trading
agenda. Tardy corporate disclosures would be the most likely form of
manipulation because the delay would give insiders and others the time
needed to capture a greater share of the change in a firm's value. Ambig-
uous corporate disclosures and signals that are used to create market
uncertainty are an even more ingenious form of manipulative trading
practice. For example, insiders may use ambiguous announcements to
enter the market and purchase their firm's securities at a lower price and
to dispose of the stocks at a higher price following a later definitive dis-
closure. Insiders may even alter the timing of corporate activities for the
sole purpose of creating intertemporal swings in the firm's value; they
incentives unless management's private trading practices are strictly regulated. See Trueman, Moti-
vating Management to Reveal Inside Information, 38 J. FIN. 1253, 1254 (1983).
37. Professor Coffee has demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between mandatory disclo-
sure and the prevalence of insider trading. See Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Casefor a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 740 (1984). Insiders can comply with disclosure
requirements and still enjoy a trading advantage if they act before the announcement has achieved its
full effect. Moreover, the delays that occur are likely to be minimal. See Scott, Insider Trading.
Rule l0b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 810 (1980). Finally, the dis-
close-or-abstain rule is likely to have little effect on management's tendency to delay releasing "bad
news." See Givoly & Palmon, Timeliness ofAnnual Earnings Announcement: Some Empirical Evi-
dence, 57 AccT. REv. 486, 489-90 (1982); Patell & Wolfson, Good News, Bad News, and the In-
traday Timing of Corporate Disclosures, 57 AccT. REv. 509, 525 (1982). Some commentators
hypothesize that upcoming audits, rather than the prospect of personal gain, drive management to
disclose bad news. See Pastena & Ronen, Some Hypotheses on the Pattern of Management's I1for-
mal Disclosures, 17 L AccT. RES. 550, 551 (1979).
38. For general descriptions of how trading in the secondary securities markets affects the allo-
cation of resources among competing productive uses, see Fama & Laffer, Information and Capital
Markets, 44 J. Bus. 289 (1971); and Hirschleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and
the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
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thereby can reap the gains of their privileged positions by anticipating the
direction of the stock's price movements. These and other disclosure
horrors, referred to here as abusive insider-trading practices, are the sub-
ject of a great deal of conjecture in the literature. However, there is little
empirical evidence on these abusive insider-trading practices.
If extensive evidence proved that abusive practices accompany in-
sider trading, the courts could justify the regulation of insider trading as
the most administrable response to curbing abusive insider-trading prac-
tices. Great uncertainty exists as to whether sound managerial judgment
or the insider's hidden trading agenda drives an announcement's timing
or its ambiguities, the initiation or delay of a corporate transaction, or
the selection of a riskier project. Insider-trading regulation is a more
administrable approach to these potential abusive insider-trading prac-
tices because it achieves two results by removing the corrupting incentive
of insider-trading profits. First, regulation eliminates the highly prob-
lematic matter of proving that the manager's desire for private gain,
rather than the corporate interest, motivated a disclosure, event, or pro-
ject. Second, regulation focuses concern upon a single event-whether
the defendant possessed and traded on confidential corporate informa-
tion-which better lends itself to external analysis than does a subjective
managerial business decision concerning corporate disclosures and oper-
ations. In this way, regulating insider trading eliminates the need to po-
lice a wide array of managerial misbehavior because it removes
managerial incentives to engage in more serious wrongdoing.
It remains a matter of conjecture whether any, let alone a sufficient,
connection exists between insider trading and the manipulation of corpo-
rate disclosures and events. Rather than leaving the question to be re-
solved more or less according to one's prejudices toward captains of
industry, the remaining discussion in this part proceeds on the assump-
tion that the above-described abuses would accompany the legalization
of insider trading. Even with such an assumption, there is reason to
doubt that the legalization of insider trading would harm the securities
market's allocational efficiency.
Capital market theory offers a useful description of probable inves-
tor and manager behavior, if we assume that investors are concerned that
the deregulation of insider trading will corrupt the timeliness and au-
thenticity of the corporation's disclosures. Insider trading occurs ran-
domly. Inside traders generally are not repeat players because all firms
do not experience the kinds of financial developments that offer ex-
traordinary returns to insiders who trade before disclosure occurs.
Moreover, regardless of the legal environment, the varying moral com-
punctions experienced by different managers about the propriety of their
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use of confidential information also causes randomness. On the other
hand, outside investors do not know ex ante which firms' managers pos-
sess inside information; nor do they know which firms' managers will
trade before disclosing that information, or will engage in abusive in-
sider-trading practices to heighten their trading profits. Due to these in-
formational deficiencies, the rational investor will assume ex ante that
each firm poses the same risk of abusive insider-trading practices as does
the market as a whole and will accordingly discount the value of each
firm by the average estimated agency cost of all firms. 39 Therefore, the
risk of abusive insider-trading practices, even though random for the in-
dividual firm, becomes systematic due to the informational asymmetries
that characterize public corporations. Because it is systematic, this risk
cannot be reduced by diversification; an investor will merely ensure that
his exposure to the harm is that of the market as a whole by adding more
securities to his portfolio.
The ultimate contribution of capital market theory to the subject of
insider trading is the support it gives to the emphasis on fiduciary rela-
tionships found in the Supreme Court's insider trading decisions. Capital
market theory offers the compelling argument that insider trading harms
the individual firm rather than the investor or the allocational efficiency
of the securities markets. Insider trading does not harm investors be-
cause they can self-insure against abusive insider-trading practices by dis-
counting all stocks by the average risk for all firms.40 If an investor holds
an efficient portfolio, the insider trading losses on one investment will be
offset by the higher return of firms whose insiders do not trade. Over
time, an investor can expect that his portfolio's insider trading losses will
sum to zero.4 1 On the other hand, the presence of abusive insider-trading
39. For a useful discussion of how buyers (i.e., investors) use various criteria to judge the qual-
ity of merchandisers, see Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
40. That such discounting occurs takes some steam out of the complaint that insider trading is
unfair. The unfairness charge reflects an isolated evaluation of the insider's conduct after he has
traded; if an ex ante assessment were made of the insider's right to trade which considered the
investors' discounting, the unfairness charge would lose its force. See Scott, supra note 37, at 809.
41. In a related context, the author has questioned the free-market proponents' argument that
it is desirable to have less demanding standards for managers, in part because owners may self-insure
by holding an efficient portfolio. See Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries
for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745, 752 (1985). Moreover, the free-market
proponents must first establish not only what is wrong with the status quo, but also why investors
should be driven to hold efficient portfolios. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. Rnv. 23, 29-31 (1982). In any case, the nearly
five-fold increase in the assets of mutual funds since 1980 evidences the recognition by the "little
guy" that attachment to a larger investor, even for a fee, can compensate for a host of disadvantages.
See Sebastian, Many Small Investors Quit Picking Stocks, Shift to Mutual Funds, Wall St. J., Feb. 7,
1986, at I, col. 6.
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practices increases each firm's cost of capital because investors discount
all firm securities by the average risk of abusive trading practices. There-
fore, many firms will seek to lower their cost of capital in order to reduce
the discount applied to them by incurring nontrivial bonding, monitor-
ing, and signaling costs designed both to deter their managers from abu-
sive insider-trading practices and to signal effectively that their firm poses
a lower risk of such practices.42 In considering how to reduce its cost of
capital, a firm will balance the marginal cost of each additional unit of
bonding, monitoring, and signaling against the accompanying marginal
benefits of reducing its managers' trading.43 Therefore, no firm will ever
be completely free from investor discounting for abusive insider-trading
practices because it is not economical to stop insider trading at any cost.
Some firms may discourage their managers from trading while
others may not; the overall effect is not to eliminate this component from
each firm's systematic risk, but to reduce it for all firms. Taking a mar-
ket perspective, the following question arises: What are the resulting so-
cial costs if many firms' managers do not seek to distinguish themselves
as nontrading managers? Some believe this to be the case; indeed many
corporations reveal no outward concern over insider trading at least inso-
far as they do not establish aggressive monitoring or bonding programs
designed to discourage insider trading.44 Because capital allocation oc-
curs within the context of a comparative assessment among competing
choices, any change that affects the cost of capital for all firms at the
same rate will not affect the relative comparisons made by investors that
42. This multiperiod signaling model for insider trading is developed in Ross, Disclosure Regu-
lation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in IssuEs
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (F. Edwards ed. 1979). See also Dooley, supra note 36, at 45-47.
43. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 324-25.
44. Professor Mendelson was the first to argue that a firm experiencing insider trading will have
a higher cost of capital. See Mendelson, supra note 34, at 477-78. If investors cannot identify which
firms are experiencing insider trading, and if insider trading opportunities are randomly distributed
across all firms, evidence that a particular firm is experiencing insider trading should not cause that
firm's cost of capital to rise above that of other firms unless the market perceives that the particular
firm has a higher-than-average likelihood of repeating the experience. If shareholders perceive that
all firms have the same risk of insider trading, and firms do not signal, bond, or monitor to reduce
the discount applied to them, the question arises whether an investor will favor other investment
opportunities over the securities markets.
The resource question also arises when all stocks have an equal risk of abusive insider-trading
practices. Assume that a firm is considering a project that offers a 9% return on investment. The
lowest cost of capital for a firm of this risk classification is 9.1% in insider-trading markets. If
insider-trading were regulated, the firm could offer a return of no greater than 9% to obtain the sums
necessary for the investment. With insider trading legal, the firm cannot undertake the project with-
out reducing its value, and the resources which would have been consumed in its undertaking will lie
dormant or will be used in a venture of a different type.
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drive the allocation of capital among the various investment choices. 45 If
abusive insider-trading practices are assumed, and if firms continue not
to signal their lower-than-average frequency of such practices, then the
legalization of insider trading would equally affect the cost of capital for
all firms. Therefore, investors will not discriminate between firms that
produce computers and those that manufacture automobiles solely on the
basis of insider-trading abuses, because investors see each firm as posing
the same risk of such practices. Hence, legalization of insider trading,
under this "lock-step" paradigm, would not adversely affect the alloca-
tional efficiency on an interfirm basis.
The rejoinder to the "lock-step" paradigm is that even though all
firms' securities reflect ex ante the same risk of insider trading, insider
trading affects resource allocation because investors are not limited to
securities markets. In theory, investors have many investment alterna-
45. Theorists suggest that managers who do not engage in insider trading will seek to avoid any
discounting of their firms' stock by distinguishing their firms from those firms whose managers do
trade. Monitoring, bonding, and signaling are commonly hypothesized devices to overcome these
asymmetries. Firms will undertake these acts, however, only up to the point at which their marginal
costs equal their marginal gains. Professor Dooley searched for evidence of these devices, reasoning
that their existence would corroborate investors' fears concerning the effects of abusive insider trad-
ing. Professor Dooley, however, focused only on whether firms directed monitoring, bonding, or
signaling solely at their managers' trading activities. Finding no evidence of manager trading activi-
ties, Professor Dooley concluded that the case of investor malaise is overstated and that insider
trading does not interfere with the allocational efficiency of securities markets. See Dooley, supra
note 36, at 44-55.
Professor Dooley's findings are consistent with two conflicting hypotheses. A failure to find
evidence of signaling, bonding, or monitoring supports the hypothesis that insider trading does not
harm the individual firm's securities. It also supports the hypothesis that managers lack a compen-
sation schedule that aligns their utility functions with the stockholders' interests. Absent an incen-
tive to maximize the firm's value, managers will not use such devices to distinguish their firm from
other firms.
Professor Dooley may not have looked at the correct indicia of signaling, monitoring, and con-
tracting. He looked exclusively at arrangements that proscribed management insider trading. As
noted earlier, investors may not fear the insider's trading itself as much as its collateral impact on
discretionary actions, such as disclosure and stewardship practices. Abundant evidence shows that
corporations employ numerous devices such as independent auditors and outside directors to mini-
mize such agency costs. See Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the
Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613, 615 (1983) ("This evidence is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that efficient, agency cost-minimizing contractual arrangements... include monitoring and
is inconsistent with the explanation that independent corporate auditing is the consequence of com-
panies or securities acts."). Express and implied liability under the federal securities laws for mis-
leading corporate announcements can be viewed as externally imposed bonding. Furthermore, even
voluntary disclosure practices serve to signal managerial qualities and insights. See generally Cox,
Insider Trading Regulation and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 475, 492-99 (1986). These factors neither support nor undermine Professor Dooley's conclu-
sions because it is too difficult to ascertain whether their existence stems from the fears of investors
concerning insider trading or from more sweeping concerns about managerial misbehavior. Profes-
sor Dooley's study is focused too narrowly because a relationship between such devices and trading
abuses clearly would arise were insider trading legalized.
[Vol. 1986:628
INSIDER TRADING
tives in markets where there are no informational asymmetries. For ex-
ample, an investor fearing insider trading in equity securities may invest
in government treasury bills, the closest available risk-free investment.
Thus, while insider trading poses no allocational problems if investors
were limited to corporate stocks and bonds, it does pose allocational
problems if investors may freely withdraw from the corporate equity
market and invest in different markets, instruments, or commodities.
46
This analysis, however, contains two significant qualifications which
in combination erode the prevalent belief that insider trading threatens
allocational efficiency. First, it is hard to envision a passive investment
that is not accompanied by serious informational asymmetries. Every
investment entails either a direct managerial component or an external
component that is connected to a managerial component. In either case,
the managerial component provides its own opportunity for abusive in-
sider-trading practices. For example, insider trading occurs even with
the risk-free treasury bill; insiders have secretly traded in treasury bills
on private knowledge concerning changes in the terms for new govern-
ment offerings.47 Second, not all investors can lawfully acquire alterna-
tive forms of investment. The most important investors, in terms of the
market's allocational efficiency, are the institutional investors that domi-
nate current capital markets; more importantly, these institutional inves-
tors are prisoners condemned by statute or charter to continue trading in
markets characterized by insider trading.48 Their sentence assures that
the vast wealth they control, which today accounts for most of the trad-
ing volume on the exchanges, cannot be moved freely to areas where the
risk of insider trading is lower. Because securities markets are the "only
46. Commentators believe that the potential for movement of funds across markets justifies
disclosure requirements designed to reduce shareholder discounting. See Coffee, supra note 37, at
722 (mandatory disclosure system improves the allocational efficiency of the economy); Fox, Shelf
Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA.
L. REV. 1005, 1015-18 (1984) (developments in regulation of securities offerings that reduce trust-
worthiness of information have effect of raising cost of capital and reducing funds available for
corporate expansion); Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68
VA. L. REV. 117, 146 n.75 (1982) (discounting may cause investors to forgo purchasing securities).
47. See In re Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (1969); see also An Apparent Leak of GNP Statistics is
Being Probed, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 18, col. 3 (reporting Treasury bond futures price rise that
occurred before release of Commerce Department information that caused interest rates to decline);
SEC Charges Navy Employee with Trading on Nonpublic Information About Contract, 14 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 682 (Apr. 23, 1982) (discussing case involving Department of Navy em-
ployee charged with purchasing stock of supplier before announcemeht of award of contract to
supplier).
48. An excellent summary of the various portfolio restrictions imposed upon financial institu-
tions appears in Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 44 n.125 (1976).
Institutional investors do spread their investments across many foreign securities markets. See Sesit,
U.S. Institutions Find Buying Foreign Stocks Can Be Very Profitable, Wall St. J., June 3, 1986, at 1,
col. 6. However, there is no reason to expect that insider trading does not exist in foreign markets.
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game in town" for a significant portion of the institutional investor's
fund, the comparative assessment among competing security choices
would appear unaffected. Therefore, the impact of insider trading on al-
locational efficiency may be overstated. Insider trading may have an ef-
fect only at the margins and it may not impact interfirm comparisons;
investors are likely to discount equally for this risk and insider-trading
practices may not drive sufficient capital to other markets to adversely
affect the operation of securities markets. For these reasons, if regulating
insider trading serves some societal interest, that interest must be more
than an interest in maintaining the allocational efficiency of securities
markets.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS
Commentators have recently advanced four arguments in support of
the proposition that the present form of insider-trading regulation is un-
justified and that the law should allow corporations to license their
agents to engage in insider trading. First, they argue that there is no
empirical evidence that insider trading is harmful. Second, they argue
that insider trading promotes stock price changes. Third, they argue that
insider trading creates managerial incentives by allowing managers to
unilaterally alter their own compensation packages through insider trad-
ing. Finally, they argue that with deregulation, managers and stockhold-
ers would contract to license the managers to engage in insider trading
because it would be to their mutual advantage to do so. Each of these
positions is examined and dismissed below.
A. The "It's An Empirical Question" Argument.
Those who abandon hope that the courts will offer insight into what
harm insider trading causes frequently turn to the law and economics
literature, where insider trading has been a lively topic for scholarly de-
bate for three decades. Professor Manne's celebrated book, Insider Trad-
ing and the Stock Market, 49 sharpened the issues in the debate over the
purpose of insider trading regulation. Before the publication of his work,
expressions such as "unfairness" and "conduct constituting a breach of
fiduciary duty" used to justify insider-trading regulation.50 Unfortu-
nately, this treatment, like the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chiarella,
conceals any thoughtful explanation why the defendant's conduct should
be subject to such pejorative characterizations. Manne redefined and
49. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
50. Id. at 4-8.
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clarified the debate by focusing on the costs and benefits of insider
trading.
The perceived costs of insider trading are many. As discussed
above,51 some believe that the legalization of insider trading would cor-
rupt the firm's disclosure practices and result in reports being delayed or
otherwise manipulated to accommodate the manager's insider-trading
designs. Managers who are not content to trade with the normal price
changes that accompany the ebb and flow of their firm's individual per-
formance may aggressively embrace high risk projects in order to induce
even greater swings in the stock's price. Moreover, they may time corpo-
rate activities to enhance their short-term trading goals. In addition,
with a complete laissez faire attitude toward insider trading, the manager
can profit as easily from bad or good news. This two-way feature is
troubling. One might see the manager's holding in his firm's stock as
beneficial because it more closely identifies the manager's interests with
those of the outside owners; however, the gap between the manager and
the outside owners widens if the manager can profit regardless of the
firm's performance. In sum, if these Various insider trading abuses are
perceived widely enough, they will erode investor confidence in Ameri-
can securities markets and increase the cost of capital for all firms.52
The free-market proponents react to this parade of horribles by em-
ploying the well-worn debating trick of framing the areas in contention
around points on which they can prevail. For example, they baldly as-
sert that insider trading is an empirical question. 53 They reason that if
insider trading is harmful, there should be some empirical evidence sup-
porting this position. On this front, their support lies in the few identifi-
able instances in which insider trading also led to manipulation of the
corporation's disclosure or operating practices.5 4 The scantness of this
evidence, they argue, indicates an absence of any measureable investor
malaise about insider trading.55 Finding no evidence that insider trading
51. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
52. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 356; Ross, supra note 42, at 182.
53. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 873; Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 338; Macey,
supra note 28, at 34.
54. See Dooley, supra note 36, at 33-36.
55. Studies show that stocks that insiders actively trade do not have larger systematic risks than
stocks that insiders seldom trade. See M. MORAN, INSIDER TRADING IN THE STOCK MARKET: AN
EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DAMAGE TO OUTSIDERS (Center for the Study of American Business
Working Paper No. 89, 1984). There exists, of course, much anecdotal evidence to the contrary. See
Insider Trading Case Reinforces Belief that Small Investor is at a Disadvantage, Wall St. J., May 20,
1986, at 2, col. 3; SEC Chief Seeking to Reassure Investors, Says Insider Trading Cases Are Limited,
Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1981, at 16, col. 2.
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causes widespread abuses or investor malaise, the free-market proponents
score the debate points.
Rephrasing the debate to focus on raw economic and empirical
questions not only guides the discourse to areas where the data favors the
free-market view, but it also discretely manipulates the burden of persua-
sion. The free-market proponents' argument that regulation is an empiri-
cal question presumes that those who favor regulation must first support
their position with empirical findings. This, of course, overlooks the fact
that regulation is the status quo. Because regulation is the status quo, it
is more appropriate that the free-market proponents should carry the
burden of persuasion as to whether a change is necessary. The locus of
the burden is of substantial importance because the free marketers' em-
pirical evidence is consistent with two equally plausible, yet opposite,
conclusions. Studies that report neither evidence of systematic abuse ac-
companying insider trading nor investor malaise over such conduct, on
the one hand, support the free-market proponents' belief that insider
trading is not harmful. On the other hand, these findings are equally
consistent with the belief that the effects of insider-trading practices do
not lend themselves to reliable empirical inquiry.
Several important factors suggest that the topic of abusive insider-
trading practices does not lend itself to reliable empirical inquiry. Em-
piricists have difficulty in identifying the feared abuses, such as the in-
sider trading itself. And when empiricists do isolate abuses, the
connection with insider trading is at best speculative. So long as insider
trading is criminally and civilly wrongful,5 6 managers will not cooperate
with the empiricist seeking to reveal trading or any other abusive con-
duct connected with trading. Thus, empiricists always will have diffi-
culty establishing whether the insider's trading delayed or prompted a
given activity or whether the delay or initiation occurred naturally and
merely provided the manager an opportunity to trade.57 Moreover, most
types of abusive insider-trading practices involve discretionary manage-
56. See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 111984) (authoriz-
ing damages equivalent to three times the amount of insider trading profits); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp.
111984) (possible criminal penalty of $100,000 fine and five years imprisonment); Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (authorizing treble damages and
costs, including attorney fees, in private action).
57. Abundant evidence exists that insiders systematically trade on the eve of significant corpo-
rate announcements. See Elliott, Morse & Richardson, The Association Between Insider Trading and
Information Announcements, 15 RAND J. ECON. 521, 529 (1984) (insiders pursue active strategy of
buying before release of good news as well as passive strategy of not selling before release of such
news); Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 36 J. FIN. 855, 866 (1981) (approximately one-half of trading volume associated with
merger announcements occurs before announcement is made); Penman, Insider Trading and the
Dissemination of Firms' Forecast Information, 55 J. Bus. 479, 492 (1982) (impact of forecast an-
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rial decisions for which there is an equally reasonable corporate interest
that justifies a manager's decision to delay disclosure, to commence a
business activity, or to report an event. Furthermore, so long as insider
trading is prohibited, it will be impossible for the empiricist to observe
managerial practices in a hypothesized free-market environment of no
regulation. Hence, the impact of deregulating insider trading on a full
array of managerial mores is beyond empirical evaluation within the cur-
rent legally constrained environment.5 8 Finally, investor malaise over in-
side trading may well affect stock valuations generally, but only at the
margins. That is, an investor's discounting for insider trading, if it exists,
is likely to be immeasureable because it is so insubstantial. However,
even undetected discounting is inconsistent with the free marketers' the-
sis that insider trading does not cause an adverse reaction. Moreover,
even slight discounting justifies an individual firm's questioning whether
it can reduce its cost of capital relative to that of the market as a whole
by proscribing trading by its insiders.
These alternate explanations for the "no empirically observable"
discounting emphasize the importance of which school of thought carries
the burden of proof. The empirical problems inherent in the insider-trad-
ing context will always produce a factual base which supports the free-
market proponents' position, regardless of the substantive deficiencies of
their views. In the end, empirical inquiry will always be unsatisfactory
because the inherent secrecy involved with insider trading ensures that
there will be no significant observable data.
B. The Efficient Stock Price Change Argument.
Without abandoning their position that the regulation of insider
trading is an empirical question, the free-market proponents also argue
for deregulation on nonempirical grounds. On this front, the free-market
proponents employ Professor Manne's thesis that insider trading pro-
nouncement on stock prices is closely correlated with amount of insider trading occurring before
announcement).
In some cases, managers have a legitimate corporate purpose for not disclosing an event. For
example, in State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981), the pur-
chaser instructed the seller to delay the announcement of a billion dollar contract for several days
while financing could be arranged. During this time, insiders took liberal advantage of this external
constraint on the firm's disclosure. Id. at 846-48. In other instances, the reason given for disclosure
delay is much more suspect. See, eg., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.
1980) (release delayed due to reluctance to correct overly optimistic financial projection). These
problems justify the SEC's enforcement of the firm's disclosure duty when the firm's insiders are
trading in its shares on the basis of material nonpublic corporate information. See In re Sharon
Steel, 1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,049, at 84,618 (D.D.C. Nov. 19,
1981).
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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motes stock price changes59 and stimulates managerial performance.60
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 61 illustrates their first point. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, a large discovery of copper and zinc near Timmins, Onta-
rio was not disclosed for five months so that the corporation could qui-
etly and cheaply acquire neighboring land. Extensive insider trading
occurred in the months between the discovery and its ultimate disclosure.
Using Manne's thesis, the free-market proponents erroneously coun-
sel that the corporate -interest justifies such trading because the gentle
nudging of the insiders' trading activity "smooths" the movement of the
stock's price to its postdisclosure equilibrium, thereby averting sharp
price changes upon announcement of the discovery. 62 To the extent in-
sider trading influences a stock's price it benefits the insider's opposite
trader who on good news gets a higher price, and on bad news purchases
at a lower price, than he would get had the insider not traded. On the
other hand, from the perspective of the insider's opposite, this is a poor
second choice to the insider first disclosing his information. The insider's
opposite is far better off with the price established by the insider's disclo-
sure of the information than he is with a price that has been modestly
nudged by the insider's secret trading.63 In the case of the insider's non-
disclosure of bad news, the opposite trader emerges owning a stock that
has a lower price after disclosure than its purchase price; and in the case
of good news, the insider's opposite emerges having sold the security for
an amount substantially below its price following disclosure.
Certainly price changes will occur more quickly and efficiently
through disclosure of the material nonpublic information than through
the manager's use of personal resources and time to trade in his firm's
stock. The insider's trading simply has too much "noise" associated with
it to be an efficient substitute for a clarion corporate announcement. 4
For example, even with the extensive insider trading activities in Texas
Gulf Sulphur, there was an extraordinary price change following the dis-
59. See H. MANNE, supra note 49, at 78-104.
60. Id. at 138-43.
61. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
62. See Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v.
SEC 13 HomSTRA L. REv. 127, 133 (1984) (arguing that insider trading is a valuable and flexible
method for communicating information to markets).
63. Of course, if the insider refrains from trading when there is no disclosure, the investor is no
better off. These effects, however, are purely redistributive, and presumably the nondisclosure ad.
vances the goals of the firm. See Levmore, supra note 46, at 122, 132-37.
64. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 34, at 631. See generally Rose, Tracking the Trades of
Corporate Insiders Doesn't Always Give an Edge to Investors, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1985, at 31, col. 4.
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closure of the discovery. 65
Cases in which there is a more modest change in the firm's fortunes
are more appealing cases than Texas Gulf Sulphur for Manne's "nudg-
ing" thesis. For example, officers may early in a firm's third quarter pos-
sess nonpublic information that the firm has finally obtained control over
the production costs for one of its many products while wholesale distrib-
utors are busy inquiring about two other product lines. The corporation
does not disclose these facts because they are too tentative. Nevertheless,
any investor selling during the period of nondisclosure would certainly
benefit by whatever effects knowledge of these events will have on the
market. Moreover, the officers, who, armed with knowledge of these
facts, decide that it is not time to sell their firm's stock, have benefited by
their use of inside information. These individuals obtain an advantage
that insider-trading regulation makes available to them by proscribing
only active trading conduct by the executives. Under these circum-
stances, an unwitting outsider may welcome the insider's trading if it
provided even modest upward propulsion in the stock's price.
This scenario appears to be the better case for Manne's nudging the-
sis, because the combination of the tentativeness of the information and
the relatively moderate magnitude of the ultimate event-a banner quar-
ter-combine to make the insider's trading a more acceptable signal to
the market insofar as such information is less likely to be disclosed
through alternative means. These factors may suggest that under such
circumstances insider trading can effect a significant portion of the price
change appropriate for the information in hand. On the other hand, in-
siders will not gamble so much of their own monies on information about
an event that remains inchoate. They may purchase, but not in sufficient
quantities to move the stock or to cause any eye-catching "blip" in the
stock's price. More importantly, any change in the stock's price related
to events such as those described above is too easily associated with the
efforts of outside analysts whose persistence and resourcefulness in prob-
65. On the first day of trading after Texas Gulf Sulphur's official announcement of the Ontario
strike, the stock price increased almost 24%; it doubled within one month. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d at 847.
Professor Manne's response to such evidence confuses the issue and shows a misunderstanding
of the difference between pre- and postannouncement stock price changes. He reasons that the stock
market efficiently reflects new information because insider trading causes the stock to change almost
instantaneously. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 561 n.43
(1970). Professor Manne overlooks the fact that if insider trading did have the benefits he identifies,
there would not be any significant price or volume change associated with the corporate announce-
ment itself. Contrary to Professor Manne's assertions, price changes do follow corporate announce-
ments and this suggests that insider trading is not an efficient signal of nonpublic information.
Moreover, evidence that markets rapidly reflect new information undermines Manne's thesis. See J.
Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING AND THE LAW 186-87 (1980).
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ing efforts within both the industry and the firm regularly detect such
changes on a daily basis. Their investigation leads ultimately to the mo-
bilization of resources that is more likely to account for stock changes
associated with such developments. For these reasons, Manne's nudging
thesis is not very compelling in even the best case scenario.
The free marketers' position that insider trading corrects the stock's
price proves too much. If accepted, this position justifies massive trading
and tipping to ensure that sufficient trading occurs to propel the stock to
the equilibrium price appropriate for the nondisclosed information. Such
widespread trading, however, compromises the corporate interest that
justified nondisclosure in the first place. Therefore, all tips to outsiders
must be on the basis of either ambiguous or misleading information so as
to conceal the correct confidential information. Ambiguous or mislead-
ing statements, however, will not perfectly match the correct confidential
information. Such surreptitious trading practices will therefore necessar-
ily be inefficient in terms of prompting the price changes that are appro-
priate for the correct, albeit concealed, information. If we accept such
ambiguous and misleading tipping practices as lawful devices that can be
used to achieve an equilibrium market price prior to the disclosure of the
correct information, it logically follows that the corporation should be
able to announce a completely false event, so long as its magnitude is
believed equal to that of the nondisclosed true event. This reasoning
would have authorized Texas Gulf Sulphur to announce that a single
core drilling in Peru revealed unusually large levels of uranium in No-
vember, 1963.
Fortunately for those of us who feel more secure with legal regimes
that discourage manipulation and encourage full disclosure, we are
spared this logical extension of Manne's "nudging" thesis. The savior in
this case is, as we have seen, that Manne's thesis has no reliable support
in either theory66 or empirical data.67
66. The deficiencies of insider trading as either a signal or other mechanism to drive prices to
the equilibrium appropriate for nondisclosed material information are described in Gilson & Kraak-
man, supra note 34, at 572-79. These deficiencies are exacerbated when the insider conceals his
identity or otherwise hides his trading activities.
67. Empiricists have studied a variety of corporate announcements to determine the relation-
ship between the amount of insider trading occurring prior to an announcement and the impact of
the announcement on the stock's price. The evidence shows that systematic insider trading occurs
prior to the announcement and that a significant change in the stock's price occurs with the actual




C. The Incentive Compensation Argument.
Because the choice between disclosure and abstention entails two
rather unburdensome options, one may wonder why the free-market pro-
ponents argue in favor of trading and nondisclosure, especially when dis-
closure is the most effective way to drive the security to its intrinsic
value. The argument that insider trading is socially beneficial because it
nudges a security's price to its appropriate equilibrium is so disingenuous
that it suggests that the free marketers do not make it in good faith, but
only use it as a transparent justification for some larger agenda. Their
embrace of insider trading fulluls the free marketers' prescription for
what "ails the American corporation"-managerial lethargy and risk
aversion.68 For these crippling afflictions, free marketers prescribe vari-
ous managerial "self help" compensation arrangements, 69 one of which is
insider trading.
To free-market proponents, managerial incentives are found first in
compensation arrangements and second in competitive markets for man-
agers and control. Compensation arrangements are intricate and must be
reviewed and renegotiated periodically. Such negotiations, however, are
time consuming and can involve the expenditure of nontrivial resources,
especially for the large public corporation. The free-market proponents
see insider trading as a means to avoid such periodic and wasteful negoti-
ations, and propose that managers be licensed to alter unilaterally their
own compensation packages through insider trading.70 Like those who
see children as always being responsible enough to decide how much of a
sweet to consume before meals, the free-market proponents see managers
as being responsible enough to accede only to the right amount of in-
sider-trading profits. They further believe that managers who are free to
trade will be stimulated to generate new information in order to provide
themselves with further opportunities to gain by trading prior to disclos-
ing the value-increasing event. The owners also benefit because such
value-enhancing information means new developments, new markets,
and other corporate events that increase the value of the firm.
The free-market proponents envision the manager's compensation
package as having upside potential, even in a down market. They argue
that managers should be free to gain from events that decrease as well as
68. See H. MANNE, supra note 49, at 578-79; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 861-66, 881;
Macey, supra note 28, at 30-32.
69. Some would expand the manager's rewards beyond mere inside trading to include appropri-
ating the corporation's business advantages and ultimately the owners' continuing interest in the
firm. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705-06 (1982).
70. See H. MANNE, supra note 49, at 138-41; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 870-71; Ma-
cey, supra note 28, at 39, 46, 57-58, 62-63.
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increase the value of the firm. Permitting managers to profit on bad
news, they argue, is necessary to overcome the manager's aversion to
risk:71 the manager will be more willing to embrace risky ventures if he
is aware that a venture's failure can nevertheless be turned into his gain
by selling short before announcing the failure. Licensing managers to
trade on inside information provides a means to reward the manager who
tried and failed. Insider trading, therefore, becomes a device for re-
warding socially beneficial entrepreneurial risk-taking.
With such a perception of the potential benefits of insider trading,
the proponents of the free-market view conclude that if managers and
shareholders could costlessly contract, they would see that licensing
managers to trade on inside information is in their mutual interest. 72 In
this respect, the private contracting approach to insider trading is a natu-
ral adjunct to the free marketers' familiar refrain that the corporation is
but a nexus of important contractual relations, 73 the most central being
the one between owners and their managers. In this realm, managers
and owners trade off costs and benefits. Therefore, stockholders will al-
low the insider to be compensated in a manner that will most likely stim-
ulate entrepreneurial activity so that they can receive the benefits of
heightened managerial effort and talent. These tradeoffs should never-
theless be judged by their relative costs and benefits. As explained below,
the free-market proponents give insufficient attention to the costs of in-
sider trading when weighing the assumed benefits.
First, the free-market proponents overlook the alternative disposi-
tions that the firm could make with its inside information. For example,
in a completely laissez faire environment, the firm could consider selling
the information to one or more traders who could thereby reap the
spread between what was paid to the firm to acquire the information and
the gain derived by trading on the information's nondisclosure. Such
marketing of the inside information has a leveraging effect of enhancing
the wealth of remaining stockholders by appropriating more of the gain
through the firm rather than the market. The firm's potential gains from
such dispositions are considerable and could easily swamp those that the
free-market proponents assert would accrue by licensing the firm's insid-
71. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 873-76.
72. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 871 (insider trading increases the manager's
incentive to acquire and develop valuable information); H. MANNE, supra note 49, at 132-33 (argu-
ing that if large corporations are to survive, a form of compensation must be devised that rewards
individual entrepreneurial effort).
73. The seminal explication of this theory is found in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L,
& EcON. 1 (1960). Professor Coase rejects the argument that free marketers draw from his work
because he assumes that parties possess perfect information before contracting. As discussed below,
this is not possible with respect to insider trading.
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ers to trade. To be sure, information is a public good in that selling it to
one person does not prevent another's use of that information. But in the
context of using corporate confidential information in capital markets
there is a crowding-out effect, whereby one person's use can easily lead
to another's indirect trading so that a later trader does not reap as great a
market advantage from the same information. Therefore, a firm wishing
to consider alternative dispositions of inside information could rightly see
that such uses must foreclose trading by its managers. In any case, the
free-market proponents should consider the benefits of the firm's alterna-
tive uses and dispositions of inside information in evaluating the dedica-
tion of inside information as a managerial prerequisite.
Second, the free-market proponents' belief that insider trading is
necessary to increase entrepreneurial activity is vulnerable on many
points. In several other areas of managerial behavior, the free-market
proponents have counseled deregulation based on their unqualified belief
that the competitive markets for managers and control pose a means to
displace managers who are risk averse, inefficient, or who otherwise fail
to maximize share values. In those areas, they believe the market offers
sufficient stimuli for the managers to excel.74 The free-market propo-
nents, however, do not consider market-based forces when they promote
insider trading as a necessary incentive for valuable entrepreneurial activ-
ity. As discussed above,75 the free-market proponents prescribe insider
trading as a device to overcome the manager's aversion to risk. How-
ever, managers who may profit equally from the corporation's gains as
from its losses can be seen as neutral to whichever event occurs. Within
such a compensation arrangement, the manager's incentives are hope-
lessly confused and certainly are not focused exclusively upon the stock-
holders' interest in maximizing the firm's value. Therefore, rather than
74. The free-market proponents generally favor deregulation in several areas of managerial be-
havior because competitive markets for managerial talent and corporate control efficiently displace
managers who fail to maximize share values. In those areas, they believe that market forces will
stimulate managers to excel. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1981); Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1982); Fischel, The Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1978); Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 275-76 (1985); Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110, 118 (1965). To be sure, the corporate
control and managerial talent markets are not perfect. The nature of team effort makes the manage-
rial talent market a forgiving one, and it requires grand scale ineptitude to motivate a firm to dis-
place another firm's incumbent management in order to acquire control. Commentators also believe
that the derivative suit will provide an incentive for those managers whose inefficiencies and misbe-
havior have not reached the displacement level. See, e.g., Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency,
Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738, 790-91 (1978).
75. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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driving managers to be risk preferring, the free-market proponents' solu-
tion enables managers to hedge on any decision and thereby become
gain-neutral.
Third, the free-market proponents assert that an additional benefit
of insider trading is that the compensation it produces is essentially self-
established because it is contingent upon events largely within the man-
agers' control. This argument's complete lack of novelty alone chal-
lenges its wisdom. Large public corporations today base a substantial
percentage of managerial compensation upon bonus arrangements condi-
tioned on some identifiable level of firm performance. 76 While the crite-
ria by which the bonus level is identified are objective, a familiar criticism
of executive bonus arrangements is that such criteria are within the con-
trol of the executives. 77 Because arrangements such as these already con-
fer large financial rewards upon managers, it is extremely doubtful that
those in the managerial ranks feel that they are seriously undercompen-
76. Earlier studies indicate that a significant portion of an executive's contingent compensation
was tied to changes in the firm's stock value. See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors'
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 559-61 (1984); Vagts, Challenges to Execu-
tive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 247-52 (1983). Management
compensation practices changed when the bear market in the latter half of the 1970's placed a drag
on management compensation. An ever increasing portion of the executive's total compensation
package, the bonus, is tied to contingent events that are not based on the firm's stock value. One
report placed the average bonus for chief executives at about 70% of annual salary. See Johnson,
Big Executive Bonuses Now Come With a Catch: Lots of Criticism, Wall St. J., May 15, 1985, at 33,
col. 4.
Professor Manne has a low opinion of these contemporary bonus plans. He does not base his
opinion, however, on a close analysis of the way the plans operate. He believes a major deficiency in
contingent bonus plans is that the people evaluating a manager's compensation level may not ap-
praise the manager's talent as highly as the manager himself values it. See H. MANNE, supra note
49, at 141-43. Thus, rather than being free to set his own compensation through insider trading, the
manager may have to dicker over his worth.
Professor Manne's criticism of contemporary contingent bonus plans contradicts the current
free-market position that legal rules reflect the bargain that the parties would enter into if they could
costlessly contract. Professor Manne's view ignores the fact that both parties to an executive com-
pensation arrangement have found the terms of that arrangement to be appropriate.
77. To the extent that these bonuses depend on financial figures rather than market values, they
are subject to manipulation within reasonable ranges. See generally J. Cox, supra note 65, at 453-59
(dealing with overall corporate smoothing of reported income); Brindisi, Why Executive Compensa-
tion Programs Go Wrong, Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 20, col. 3 (executive compensation packages
do not benefit shareholders equally). The ability to manipulate the bonus increases when perform-
ance is based on short time horizons. See Rappaport, Don't Sell Stock Market Horizons Short, Wall
St. J., June 27, 1983, at 28, col. 3. Nevertheless, executive bonus arrangements more recently have
begun to reflect a reward for gains directly connected to the executive's contributions. Moreover,
these arrangements tie the rewards to gains within the firm over a three- to five-year period. See
Bennett, More Managers Find Salary, Bonus Are Tied Directly to Performance, Wall St. J., Feb. 28,
1986, at 27, col. 5.
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sated78 and are clamoring for insider-trading profits as an incentive re-
ward for further efforts. In this regard, it is significant that most insider-
trading cases have not involved those whose entrepreneurial or other
managerial efforts have produced the value-increasing event that was
traded upon. Instead, the defendants have been outside directors, profes-
sionals, or clerks whose assistance was used to complete the transaction,
not to create it.
In combination, these three complaints strike at the free-market pro-
ponents' thesis that inside trading will stimulate socially useful manage-
rial and entrepreneurial activity. On reflection, the prevailing system of
market-based penalties and performance-based reward mechanisms pro-
vides substantial incentives without the problem of gain-neutral manag-
ers or abusive insider-trading practices. 79 The argument that corpora-
tions should be allowed contractually to license their executives to trade
on inside information contains an even more fundamental flaw: parties
can not efficiently contract without reliable cost/benefit information.
This flaw is closely examined in the following section.
D. The Licensing Through Contracting Argument.
The dominant constraint to the belief that parties will enter into
mutually advantageous contractual arrangements is that they must know
the consequences of their acts. It is essential, therefore, that parties
know the costs and benefits of their actions if they are to negotiate a
mutually advantageous contract.80 Estimating costs and benefits is prac-
tical in a good many legal areas. For example, certain torts such as nui-
sances lend themselves to privately negotiated settlements because the
78. One survey shows that the average chief executive of a public corporation earns over
$750,000 per year, and that the average outside director earns over $279,100 per year. HEIDRICK &
STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982).
79. Judge Easterbrook reports that managers of large corporations own an average of $150,000
of their firm's stock and that share values increase upon adoption of long-term compensation plans
that increase management's ownership interest. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 540, 558 (1984).
This evidence supports the view that corporations can develop compensation plans without hidden
costs which benefit stockholders.
80. In most contracting situations the parties do not know their respective costs and benefits
because of numerous unpredictable variables over which they have no control. Nevertheless, esti-
mates of the range of the possible outcomes are a necessary part of rational contracting. Such esti-
mates do not reduce the parties' uncertainty over the ultimate benefits to be derived from their
contract. However, numerous standard form terms in contracting owe their existence to the contri-
bution they make toward reducing the parties' uncertainty over the expected costs and benefits. See
Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. RE. 1089, 1095-110 (1981). In the case
of contractual arrangements involving personal services, general fiduciary obligations are a substitute
for the standard contracting form that may otherwise be used to reduce the parties' uncertainty over
the level of performance. Id. at 1126-30. Even here, there is a balance of each party's respective
costs and benefits. Id. at 1129.
Vol. 1986:628]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
parties can compare the plaintiff's nuisance damages to the defendant's
abatement costs as well as the defendant's benefit from engaging in the
nuisance activity.8
1
Unfortunately, it is not as easy to estimate the costs and benefits of
insider trading, for the problem of quantification is substantial. In the
case of insider trading, stockholders must not only be able to quantify the
benefits-such as increased efficiency and more aggressive en-
trepreneurial activity-that they will receive from licensing managers to
trade on confidential corporate information, but they also must know
whether and by what amount these benefits will be accompanied by costs
such as abusive insider-trading practices. Because so much of the activi-
ties of a business are team functions and frequently the result of forces
beyond management's control, it is difficult to quantify the gains attribu-
table to entrepreneurial activity generally, let alone the gains attributable
to each individual manager's contribution toward these benefits.
Moreover, the costs of insider trading are open-ended. Minimally,
insider-trading costs amount to a transfer of wealth to the inside trader
from his opposite trader. In the case of good news, the insider can
purchase shares in the market to the extent that his personal resources
permit. A manager's gain, however, is not limited to the amount of per-
sonal wealth that he commits to trading. Options trading greatly ex-
pands the insider's trading gains and, hence, wealth transfers to the
insider.8 2 In the case of bad news, the accompanying welfare transfer is
also immeasureable because the insider can engage in short trading.8 3 In
sum, the opposite trader's insider-trading costs are beyond quantifica-
tion. Furthermore, hidden costs associated with various abusive insider-
trading practices must also be taken into account. As discussed above,
the existence and magnitude of such costs pose an insolvable problem,
especially in the context of ex ante contracting.
To be sure, the parties may establish an arbitrary ceiling on the in-
sider's gains; this approach, however, does not ensure that owners will
believe it is in their interest to contract.84 Even though the parties can
81. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 122-24 (2d ed. 1977).
82. In one instance, an AMAX director's son earned $427,000 in just 48 hours by purchasing
an option for $3,125 on a tip from his father that AMAX would soon announce a merger with
Standard Oil of California. See Longstreth, SEC Battle against Insider Trading Is Worth the Effort,
Legal Times, May 10, 1982, at 16, col. 2.
83. Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1982), currently prohibits
officers and directors from selling shares short. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 893-94.
84. Both Professor Brudney and Professor Clark make the important point that the contract
analogy is flawed because officers technically are not the agents or employees of the shareholders.
Officers are appointed by directors who oversee the corporation's affairs. See Clark, Agency Costs
Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55-58 (1985);
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
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artificially establish a ceiling on the insider's trading profits, so that at
least one dimension of the cost to owners is contained, there remains
great uncertainty over whether the owners can reasonably expect benefits
of an amount sufficient to justify these costs. Such a ceiling would likely
have to reflect each insider's unique characteristics, including his per-
sonal indifference curve. This individual tailoring robs insider trading of
its purported virtue of being a compensation mechanism that avoids
costly contracting and monitoring. Moreover, a ceiling on insider trad-
ing would not contain the other costs associated with abusive insider-
trading practices. The license to trade, even if trading is reasonably lim-
ited, can still provide ample incentives for costly manipulative practices.
Finally, any ceiling arrangement is fraught with the substantial incentive
for the manager to secretly trade so as to reap gains greater than those
permitted by the contract's terms.8 5
The contract analogy simply fails to offer a workable format because
its central condition-a capability on the part of the parties to reliably
estimate their respective costs and benefits-cannot be satisfied in the
case of insider trading. This does not mean, however, that the reference
to contracting is futile or without significance. Quite to the contrary, the
parties' likely contracting positions reveal that owners would not believe
that it is in their best interest to license managers to trade.
IV. THE CORPORATION'S INTEREST IN REGULATION
Those who champion the view that stockholders will benefit by pri-
vately contracting for all matters of managerial discretion overlook the
inherent institutional problems of the public corporation that impair the
parties' incentives and ability to contract optimally. The separation of
ownership from management problem is easier to overcome through con-
tracting when there is a single owner than when there are large numbers
of passive owners. The single owner will seek to reduce managerial
shirking, self-dealing, and cheating so long as the costs of his efforts do
1403, 1428-30 (1985). This distinction, while an important one, does not completely dispose of the
question. Shareholders do elect their directors, and, therefore, any concern over the officers' stew-
ardship can impact the shareholders' decisions in nominating, voting for, or removing directors.
85. There is every reason to believe that managers will not find insider trading to be desirable if
it results in an equal reduction in their fixed compensation. Risk averse managers will prefer a fixed
salary of $100,000 over a fixed salary of $50,000 plus a 10% chance of $500,000 insider trading
profits. The amount of potential insider trading profits needed to make the two types of compensa-
tion arrangements equivalent will differ in accordance with individual indifference curves. This
makes it difficult to impose ex ante any meaningful ceilings on their trading profits because of the
necessity to tailor each ceiling for the individual manager.
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not exceed the expected benefits. 86 The contracting costs are greater for
the public corporation because there are a greater number of units within
the bargaining group. In addition, each stockholder receives only a pro-
portionate share of the expected benefits. Both the presence of high costs
and shared benefits discourage stockholders from privately contracting
with their managers. 87 Stockholders will not expend their own resources
to constrain managerial misbehavior because the passive stockholders
will still receive a proportionate share of the resulting benefits; this free
rider problem discourages any stockholder from taking action. 88 Alter-
natively, poor coordination among stockholders may result in a duplica-
tion of efforts, leading to excessive monitoring and contracting. 89
For these reasons, the developed standardized rules, which may take
the form of statutory directives or common law obligations, approximate
the bargain that stockholders and managers would strike if they could
contract at no cost. Free-market proponents view such externally devel-
oped rules as socially optimal substitutes for uneconomical private con-
tracting.90 Others might see this as too narrow a view of the role and
content of fiduciary obligations. A middle ground between these two
views is to reason that an arrangement which stockholders would never
enter into if they could costlessly contract should not comprise an exter-
nally imposed fiduciary obligation. It is this point that is used below in
rejecting the free-market proponents' belief that insider trading should be
deregulated.
86. This is not to suggest that one or more owners do not need standardized obligations. It is
not economical or practicable to specify all the details necessary to regulate the manager's behavior.
Nor is it desirable that provisions common to such arrangements must constantly, like the wheel, be
reinvented and renegotiated. Hence, the desirability of enactments such as the Uniform Partnership
Act and of the development of generalized fiduciary obligations of agents has been recognized. See
W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 61-69 (1980).
87. See Anderson, supra note 74, at 778-81.
88. Id. at 778-80.
89. High communication costs for a large group of stockholders can cause coordination
problems. These problems are exacerbated if time is of the essence. Thus, rational stockholders will
enact measures to reduce their coordination costs and eliminate time pressures. One classic illustra-
tion is the imposition of a supermajority voting requirement before the firm can be acquired. See
Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellants, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against
Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341, 374-78. Another illustration is the imposition of
cumulative voting, see Anderson, supra note 74, at 779-80.
90. This is not to suggest that the characteristics of fiduciary standards will be identical to the
characteristics of private contracting standards. See Clark, supra note 84, at 71-76 (faulting econo-
mists for overlooking important differences between the four identifying characteristics of fiduciary
duties). Collectively, a large group of shareholders bargain for results that differ from those bar-
gained for by a small number of individuals. Inquiry into stockholders' interests is, as Clark's own
reasoning reveals, id. at 77-78, a useful beginning point. It seems more appropriate to say that
externally developed rules at a minimum reflect what the parties would have provided for if they
could have costlessly contracted.
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A further consideration of the nature of externally imposed fiduci-
ary obligations in the form of insider-trading rules is their collateral ben-
efit of overcoming the natural bargaining advantage managers enjoy over
remote owners. 91 If only private contracting existed, the manager's ad-
vantage would enable him to manipulate the terms of the agreement to
his own benefit. This feature is particularly important in the area of in-
sider trading. Management unquestionably has an incentive to acquire
shareholders' stock at discounted prices by insider trading or leveraged
buyouts. It is therefore in the manager's interest to manipulate the con-
tract to earn the rewards of apparently complying with its provisions and
at the same time secretly trading outside his established compensation
schedule. For example, it is not surprising to find that while bonus ar-
rangements recently have become the dominant part of managerial com-
pensation packages, they generally are not measured by criteria which tie
managers' gains to increases in shareholder wealth. For these reasons,
private contracting arguments are better understood as suggesting that
the foundations of externally imposed rules are minimally those require-
ments which the parties would have agreed to if they could have
costlessly contracted.
As discussed above, there is no basis to believe that authorizing
managers to engage in insider trading is in the shareholders' interest.
Managers control the knowledge of such an arrangement and therefore
have an incentive to overstate not only the total amount of the benefits,
but also their contribution toward those benefits. Also, there is no relia-
ble means by which the shareholders can satisfy themselves that an ap-
propriate balance is maintained between those benefits and the attendant
insider-trading costs. An external prohibition of insider trading can
therefore be justified on the basis that stockholders have little to gain and
much to lose by licensing their managers to trade on inside information.
In this way the prevailing prohibition is consistent with what the parties
would have privately agreed to were such negotiations practicable. That
is, in place of a compensation device so ripe with informational asymme-
tries as insider trading, shareholders will rationally prefer unqualified
openness for their managers' compensation arrangement. The prohibi-
91. See Anderson, supra note 74, at 781 (noting that managers have no interest in drafting
contracts adverse to their own interest); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 69, at 702 (noting that
managers will manipulate articles to their own advantage). Small investors tend to support charter
provisions designed to discourage the takeover of the firm because they are not likely to have the
incentive to scrutinize managements' true motives; institutional investors, on the other hand, usually
disfavor such provisions. This indicates that managers may be taking undue advantage of the small
stockholders. See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations
on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 775, 822-27 (1982).
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tion of insider trading achieves this result.92
At least three reasons other than the uncertain costs and benefits of
a free-market approach to insider trading also justify the insider trading
prohibition. First, knowledge of an executive's compensation sources is
indispensable for understanding what motivates his discretionary behav-
ior. When an executive's compensation is tied to changes in the firm's
value, or his renewal is conditioned upon achieving a stated performance
level, investors are better assured that the manager will act in the share-
holders' best interests than when compensation is not linked to an inter-
est held by the shareholders. This knowledge also permits superiors to
rely upon the same assumptions regarding their subordinates' activities.
Investors and superiors can form these assumptions more easily when the
compensation arrangement is free from the noise that insider trading cre-
ates by allowing managers to win with both good and bad news.
Second, an assessment of the manager's stewardship of the firm (an
assessment dear to the hearts of free-market proponents as well as those
who are not entirely comfortable with a free market) can occur only with
full knowledge of both the executive's costs and his team's productiv-
ity.93 Licensing managers to trade on inside information is similar to
licensing managers to embezzle because in both cases the individual in-
vestor cannot assess the firm's return on its capital or the manager's com-
pensation in light of his productivity. Therefore, shareholders expect a
92. My position that insider trading regulation is justifiable implies a rejection of the prevalent
notion that investors have a private right of action for the manager's violation of the disclose-or-
abstain rule. Recognition of a private right of action is of no consequence, though, because the
private litigant has been a free rider to the detection and enforcement efforts of the SEC in insider
trading cases. See Dooley, supra note 36, at 8-18.
Professor Macey has concluded that all insider trading regulation should be privatized. See
Macey, Too Strict a Crackdown Will Harm Markets, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 34, col. 4. This
conclusion is not well-founded. The elaborate market surveillance devices that exist within various
organizations as well as the increasing sophistication of order processing suggest that there are econ-
omies of scale in the enforcement of insider-trading rules. Just as one would certainly not deprive
the corner gas station of local police protection, it is unreasonable to suggest that there is no role for
public enforcement because employers will terminate their inside traders who are discovered. More-
over, the presence of distinct social and psychological barriers within the American corporation
makes it doubtful that the corporation can clean its own stable. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 83-108.
93. Some important insiders are not full-time employees, but outside directors and various pro-
fessionals retained by the corporation for specialized projects. This group, however, has the weakest
claim to any insider-trading prerogatives. Not among the "movers and shakers" championed by the
free-market proponents, they are either highly compensated footmen (in the case of lawyers and
accountants) or highly reliable monitors (in the case of directors) employed to curb management's
misperception of the corporate interest. In either case, because an outsider's functions and compen-
sation customarily are well understood, it is unfair for the outsider to secretly augment that compen-
sation without prior consent.
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regime that prohibits employment- derived earnings that are neither au-
thorized nor fully disclosed. This is accomplished by prohibiting insider
trading.
Third, shareholders expect the executive to concentrate on their
welfare rather than his private investment agenda. The prohibition
against insider trading is similar to the prohibition against a manager
spending his time in the office developing his own interests; each prohibi-
tion stems from the shareholders' expectation that a manager is paid to
look after the shareholders' welfare, not his own.
These three aspects of the 'employment relationship justify the con-
tinuation of insider trading regulation because employers, like consum-
ers, have rationally based expectations about what they are purchasing
when they hire managers or other professionals. Without a prior under-
standing between the firm and its insiders regarding the latter's trading
prerogatives, the parties expect that the insider's compensation will be no
more and no less than what their agreement provides. An insider unlaw-
fully acquires gains by embezzling firm assets, deflecting a corporate op-
portunity, or using corporate information, because these matters are
outside the employment contract. The parties could have raised these
matters in their negotiations. Because owners, acting rationally, would
see that licensing an insider to trade leaves nothing to be gained and a
good deal to be lost, they will not license their insiders to trade. There-
fore, the insider breaches his employment agreement when he trades.
The earlier discussed arguments of the free-market proponents-
concerning empirical evidence, efficient price changes, and managerial
incentives-independently fail to justify a laissez faire approach to in-
sider trading. And, in light of the potential costs and questionable bene-
fits of licensing managers to trade, the free-market proponents' notion of
private contracting fails to justify deregulation. The irony for the free-
market proponents' position concerning the desirability of private con-
tracting is that the prohibition against insider trading is justified, not in
spite of contract principles, but because of them.
